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In this paper, we use a two-stage bargaining model to analyze the living arrangement of a 
disabled elderly parent and the assistance provided to the parent by her adult children. The 
first stage determines the living arrangement: the parent can live in a nursing home, live alone 
in the community, or live with any child who has invited coresidence. The second stage 
determines the assistance provided by each child in the family. Working by backward 
induction, we first calculate the level of assistance that each child would provide to the parent 
in each possible living arrangement. Using these calculations, we then analyze the living 
arrangement that would emerge from the first stage game. A key assumption of our model is 
that family members cannot or will not make binding agreements at the first stage regarding 
transfers at the second stage. Because coresidence is likely to reduce the bargaining power of 
the coresident child relative to her siblings, coresidence may fail to emerge as the equilibrium 
living arrangement even when it is Pareto efficient. That is, the outcome of the two-stage 
game need not be Pareto efficient. 
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1.  Introduction 
  Many countries are currently facing the aging of their populations and aging 
populations imply an increasing number of disabled elderly persons requiring assistance 
with their everyday activities.  The United States, many European countries, Australia and 
Japan have all been actively investigating policies to reform their long-term care systems for 
the disabled elderly to control costs, improve access and ensure quality.
1  Countries differ in 
the role of the government in financing long-term care, the extent to which they provide 
cash rather than in-kind assistance, and in the degree to which long-term care is means-
tested rather than universal.  Most countries, however, are committed to providing those 
disabled elderly who wish to remain in the community the opportunity to do so.
2  For 
example, in the United States nearly two-thirds of the 5.5 million elderly with chronic 
disabilities rely, often exclusively, on family members for help with basic activities of daily 
living (Spillman and Pezzin 2000).  Much of the assistance provided by family members 
takes place in the context of coresidence of the disabled elderly with adult children.  
Although evidence suggests a secular increase in living alone among the elderly (Kotlikoff 
and Morris 1990), coresidence of disabled elderly parents with their adult children remains 
fairly common in the United States (Crimmins and Ingegneri 1990; Davis et al. 1997); in 
                     
1 Of the thirty oldest countries, as measured by the percentage of the population over age 
sixty-five, twenty-five are European countries (Gibson, Gregory and Pandya 2003). 
2 There are important social and cultural differences across countries that affect the role of 
families in providing care.  For example, in France and Italy the expectation is that adult 
children will provide care, and public assistance is contingent on them providing care. In 
Germany family caregivers may be eligible for public pensions.  See Gibson, Gregory and 





2003 nearly one-fifth of all family households with a member 65 or older contained at least 
one of the householder's children aged 18 or older (U.S. Census Bureau).  Coresidence of 
elderly parents with adult children is even more prevalent in other parts of the world.  In 
Europe, over one-quarter (26%) of all individuals 60 or older live with an adult child, with 
figures ranging from 43% in Spain to 4.1% in Denmark (United Nations 2005).  
Coresidence rates in Africa, Asia, and Latin America range from two-thirds to three-
quarters (United Nations 2005) 
  Coresidence has been linked to both the well-being and health of the elderly.  For 
example, disabled elderly persons who coreside with adult children are less likely than their 
non-coresiding counterparts to make a transition into a nursing home (Garber and MaCurdy 
1990; Kemper and Pezzin 1996; Dostie and Leger 2005).  Moon (1983) provides some 
evidence that coresidence promotes the health of the disabled elderly: she finds that those 
cared for in the home of a family member have better health outcomes than those in similar 
health who were cared for in an institution. 
  Coresidence may also benefit the child.  Household public goods can be jointly 
consumed or produced; additionally, economies of scale and other efficiency gains in 
consumption and production make coresidence less costly than providing equivalent 
services without coresidence.  For example, by sharing a household, adult children may 
lower the time cost of providing care since travel costs can be avoided.  Coresidence, 
however, reduces privacy for the adult child and, depending on the alternative living 
arrangement, may also reduce privacy for the elderly parent. 





numerous individual and joint decisions by family members with different preferences 
facing different constraints.  Family members not only make caregiving decisions on behalf 
of disabled family members but often provide hands-on care themselves and share the 
financial consequences of caregiving decisions.  Moreover, the preferences of the disabled 
elderly may differ from those of their spouses and their adult children, and the preferences 
of one child may differ from those of another.  Differences may arise about the type of care 
desired for the disabled elderly and the setting in which they receive it.  For example, 
children may want a parent to enter a nursing home, while the parent prefers to live 
independently; or, a brother may want his sister to care for their mother while the sister 
wants her brother or his wife to be the primary caregiver.  The possibility of conflict 
regarding caregiving and the roles of different family members in providing care suggest 
that family members may have incentives to behave strategically. 
  In this paper we develop a model of family caregiving for the unpartnered disabled 
elderly that captures important features of the complex interactions between elderly parents 
and adult children and among the children.  The partnered (e.g., married) disabled elderly 
are likely to receive care from their partners (e.g., spouses) rather than from children 
(Dwyer and Coward 1991) and are less likely than the unpartnered to enter an institution 
(Freedman 1996).  Thus, because of the costs they impose on government budgets, the 
unpartnered disabled elderly are a group of particular policy interest and we restrict our 
attention to them.  To avoid analytical complications, we focus on the case of a widowed 
parent with unmarried children.  This focus avoids the complications associated with 





have caregiving responsibilities for their own parents.
3   
  We propose and analyze a two-stage game with three players: a disabled parent and 
two adult children.  The first stage determines the living arrangements and the second stage 
determines intrafamily transfers.  The stages are related because first-stage decisions affect 
second-stage bargaining power; the stages are distinct, however, because we assume that 
family members cannot or will not make binding commitments regarding their future 
behavior.  We show that even if the second stage is conditionally efficient (i.e., efficient 
given the living arrangements determined in the first stage), the equilibrium of the two-stage 
game may be inefficient.   
  We argue that government long-term care policies have efficiency as well as 
distributional implications.  The distributional implications of government long-term care 
policies are widely recognized and are analogous to the distributional implications of old-
age benefits and health insurance for the elderly.  That is, government policies redistribute 
the burden of caring for the elderly between generations, within generations, between 
families, and within families.  Discussions of the efficiency implications of government 
long-term care policies often treat the disabled elderly as individuals rather than as members 
of families.  When families are recognized, the long-term care literature had generally 
                     
3 Laferrère and Wolff (2006) survey the literature on family transfers.  We ignore the 
possibility that transfers from children to their disabled elderly parents are motivated by the 
expectation of bequests, as suggested by the strategic bequest model of Bernheim, Shleifer, 
and Summers (1985).  Pollak (1988) argues that, if the parents would prefer to divide their 
bequethable wealth equally among their children, then the threat to disinherit a child who 
fails to provide sufficient attention is not credible.  Perozek (1998) discusses empirical 
problems in Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985).  McGarry (2006) surveys the 






assumed that families respond efficiently to the incentives created by government policy.  
We relax that assumption.   
  Long-term care for the disabled elderly has sparked a growing literature.  The 
economics literature, surveyed in Norton (2000), focuses on the supply and demand for 
nursing home care and on long-term care insurance, but pays little attention to the family.  
Early studies that discuss the role of the family concentrate primarily on support from 
children to parents in the form of shared housing, analyzing the determinants of living 
arrangements (Börsch-Supan, 1989; Börsch-Supan, Kotlikoff, and Morris, 1991; Ellwood 
and Kane, 1990; Kotlikoff and Morris, 1990; Börsch-Supan, et al., 1992; Börsch-Supan, 
McFadden, and Schnabel, 1996).  
  The first generation of research on families’ care arrangements relied on Becker’s 
model of the family (Wolf and Soldo, 1994; Ettner, 1995 and 1996; Kemper and Pezzin, 
1996).  More recent work has used game-theoretic bargaining models to examine family 
care arrangements.  Two examples will suffice.  Pezzin and Schone (1999a, 2002a) specify 
and analyze a model of living arrangements, informal caregiving, labor force participation, 
and cash transfers.  Their game involves two players, an elderly parent and an adult 
daughter, each with a utility function defined over a vector of private goods, leisure (for the 
daughter), and a public good, representing the parent's physical health.  Conditional on the 
parent’s disability, the production of the parent's physical health requires that the parent 
receive some form of care, whether formal (i.e., paid) or informal (i.e., unpaid).  Parent and 
daughter make decisions that determine the levels of private consumption, leisure, cash 





to produce the parent's physical health or well-being, and the living arrangement (either 
separate or coresidence).  As in the separate spheres model of Lundberg and Pollak (1993), 
Pezzin and Schone assume that intrahousehold allocation is determined as the solution to a 
cooperative Nash bargaining game in which the threat point is the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium of a noncooperative game. 
  Heidemann and Stern (1999) and Engers and Stern (2002) develop a game theoretic 
model of family bargaining designed to motivate a structural empirical model of family 
long-term care decisions.  In particular, they focus on determining whether the parent enters 
a nursing home, lives independently with no care provided by her children, or, if the parent 
does receive care from her children, which child becomes the primary caregiver.  In their 
formulation, each adult child decides independently whether to attend a meeting in which 
living and care arrangements for the disabled parent are determined.  Both voluntary and 
compulsory participation versions are analyzed and estimated, with results favoring the 
voluntary model.  The children who participate reach a binding agreement while the non-
participating children are excluded from family decision making and bear no responsibility 
for caring for the parent.  For each child, the decision of whether to attend the meeting 
depends on the value she places on participating in the decision, the side payments that she 
anticipates, and the effect that she anticipates her presence at the meeting would have on the 
family's decision. 
   Much of the research examining family caregiving has focused on the parent-child 
dyad.  Although most studies have included variables summarizing the characteristics of the 





and 2006b, Pezzin and Schone 1999b and 2002b; Stern 1994 and 1995), little work has 
analyzed interactions among the adult children.  Papers that analyze caregiving with 
interactions of two or more children include Engers and Stern (2002), Checkovich and Stern 
(2002), Pezzin and Schone (2001), and Pezzin, Pollak, and Schone (2005a). 
  To analyze interactions among adult children, we build on research that has modeled 
intrahousehold allocation within a game theoretic framework (Manser and Brown 1980; 
McElroy and Horney 1981; Lundberg and Pollak 1993, 1994, and 2003).  Game theoretic 
models are especially suitable for analyzing intergenerational living and transfer 
arrangements because they recognize the divergent and often conflicting interests of family 
members. They also specify a process for translating these divergent interests into 
outcomes.  In the next three sections we analyze various three person games involving a 
disabled elderly parent and two adult children. We examine living arrangements, 
interhousehold transfers, and intrahousehold transfers.  In section 2 we describe the two-
stage caregiving game.  Like all dynamic games, our two-stage sequential game is solved by 
backward induction.  In section 3 we analyze the second-stage game.  We argue that, for 
plausible specifications, the equilibrium of the second stage game is likely to be Pareto 
efficient conditional on the living arrangement when the parent lives on her own in the 
community, or in a nursing home, and may be Pareto efficient when she lives with one of 
her children.  In section 4 we analyze the first stage game which determines the living 
arrangement.  We show that, even if the equilibrium of the second stage game is 
conditionally efficient, the equilibrium of the full game need not be Pareto efficient.  Section 






2. A caregiving game with two children 
  We consider four possible living arrangements for the parent: living in a nursing 
home (A
n), living on her own in the community (A
o), living with child 1 (A
1), and living 
with child 2 (A
2).  The parent's utility in each of these living arrangements depends on the 
living arrangement itself and on her consumption of a private consumption good (C).  We 
use the superscripts {n, o, 1, 2} to indicate the living arrangement and the subscripts {p, 1, 
2} to indicate family members.  Thus, C
o
2 denotes private consumption by child 2 when the 
parent lives alone, and  C
2
1 denotes consumption by child 1 when the parent lives with child 
2.  We assume that children care about their own private consumption and about the parent's 
private consumption.  We also assume that the children care about the parent's living 
arrangement, which affects the parent's well being and the child's privacy.  
Economists' usual assumption about preferences -- what Becker (1981) calls 
"altruistic" preferences -- implies that the children defer to the disabled parent's preferences 
over her own consumption and, in some cases, over her living arrangements as well.  For 
example, Becker’s children would defer to the parent’s preference between living in a 
nursing home and living on her own in the community.  We regard Becker's altruistic 
preferences as an implausible special case even when the parent is mentally competent and 
especially implausible when the parent is cognitively impaired (e.g., with Alzheimer’s).  We 
also dislike Becker's terminology, which forces us to say that a child who rejects a disabled 





 safely live alone) is not altruistic.
4  In this paper we treat consumption as one dimensional, 
avoiding the issue of merit goods except in regard to living arrangements.  Pezzin and 
Schone (1999a; 2002a) analyze a model with two goods, one of which is a merit good. 
  We model family interactions as a two-stage game in which both stages may contain 
substages.  The first stage is noncooperative and determines the living arrangement.  The 
second stage determines consumption.  We assume that family members cannot or will not 
make binding agreements at the first stage regarding care giving at the second stage.  Hence, 
the assistance that a child provides at the second stage, although it may be predictable at the 
first stage, is determined at the second stage.
5 
  Although we cannot directly observe the impact of not having binding agreements 
on decisions made at the second stage, the lack of binding agreements may partially explain 
some empirical regularities associated with caregiving.  For example, the concentration of 
caregiving by coresident caregivers and the relatively small amount of assistance provided 
by the noncoresident children may reflect the fact that, once the parent begins to live with 
one child, the other children reduce the care they provide confident that the coresident child 
will make up the difference. 
                     
4  In the introduction to the 1991 edition of his Treatise on the Family, Becker concedes that 
"The most unsatisfactory aspect of my discussion...[in the 1981 edition is]...the failure to 
combine the discussion of 'merit goods' and altruism" (p. 10).  Just as merit goods can 
motivate paternalistic governments to provide tied transfers (e.g., food stamps), merit goods 
can motivate paternalistic family donors, when they have the ability, to provide tied rather 
than untied transfers.  Pollak (1988) proposed a model in which family members have 
paternalistic preferences.  In place of Becker's term, "altruistic" preferences, Pollak (2003) 
argues that "deferential" preferences is more descriptive.  
5 As a referee points out, living arrangements are not determined in a one-shot game.  Most 
obviously, a decision that the parent live on her own in the community can be revisited if 





Suppose, for example, that the first stage begins with the children deciding, 
separately and simultaneously, whether or not to invite the parent to coreside and ends with 
the parent choosing among the feasible living arrangements: she can move into a nursing 
home, live on her own, or accept the invitation of any child who has invited her to coreside. 
 At the second stage, taking as given the living arrangement determined at the first stage, the 
children and the parent make decisions that determine resource allocation under that living 
arrangement.  We can model the second stage as a noncooperative game or as a cooperative 
game; alternatively, we can finesse some but not all of the difficulties of modeling the 
second-stage game by postulating an "allocation rule."  We define an allocation rule as a 
specification of each family member's second-stage behavior as a function of the living 
arrangement, which is determined in the first stage, of the economic and demographic 
characteristics of all players, and of any relevant policy parameters (e.g., voucher programs, 
tax subsidies for caregivers, allowances for dependent care). 
  We have adopted and adapted the idea of an allocation rule from Chiappori (1988, 
1992) who proposed a "sharing rule."  In the context of allocation between spouses within 
marriage, the sharing rule specifies the utility of the two spouses as a function of variables 
assumed to determine bargaining power.  Chiappori assumes that the sharing rule is single-
valued and Pareto efficient.  Chiappori postulates the sharing rule directly, and does not 
attempt to derive it from an underlying model of bargaining.  Unlike Chiappori's sharing 
rule, our allocation rule describes the allocation of goods rather than utility and, again unlike 
Chiappori’s sharing rule, our allocation rule need not be single-valued or Pareto efficient.  






By beginning with the allocation rule, we avoid not only the need to analyze the second-
stage game but also the need to specify it, or even to specify whether it is cooperative or 
noncooperative. 
  A priori, it is unclear whether family decision making should be modeled as a 
cooperative or a noncooperative game.  Shubik (1989, p. 103) asserts that noncooperative 
game theory "is generally not so useful to describe complex, loosely structured social 
interaction."  Family bargaining -- whether between spouses within marriage, between an 
adult child and a disabled parent, or among adult children -- exemplifies such interactions.  
But the usefulness of cooperative game theory is also problematic.  First, although 
cooperative game theory allows us to proceed without specifying the "rules of the game" -- 
the strategies available to each player, or in extensive form, the sequence of moves and the 
information available to each player at each move – noncooperative game theory teaches 
that the rules of the game are often crucial determinants of the outcome.  Thus, by modeling 
interactions as a cooperative game we necessarily disregard the strategic factors that may 
determine the outcome.  Second, the efficiency of social arrangements and practices is a 
central concern of economics and of public policy, yet cooperative bargaining models 
assume that outcomes are Pareto efficient.  Hence, cooperative bargaining models are 
incapable of investigating the conditions that make it possible to achieve and sustain 
efficient outcomes because cooperative models refuse to recognize the possibility of 
inefficiency.  Because complex, loosely structured social interactions are very difficult to 
model, we regard the choice between modeling family interactions as a noncooperative or a 





we consider alternative specifications of the second stage game. 
 
3. The second stage game: child to parent transfers 
  For each of the four possible living arrangements, we consider several formulations 
of the second stage game which determines transfers from children to the parent.  We 
assume that each child's utility is increasing in the parent's consumption and in her own 
consumption, but is independent of her sibling's consumption.  Hence, a child's utility 




o. Suppose that the parent lives on her own in the community. 
When the parent lives independently in the community or in a nursing home, we assume that 
the parent accepts whatever transfers the children offer her.  Hence, with these living 
arrangements, the parent is not a strategic player in the second stage game.
7  The children 
may play a one-shot noncooperative game, a repeated cooperative game, or a cooperative 
game.  We consider each of these in turn. 
 
  A
o.i. A noncooperative, one-shot, voluntary contribution game.     
The one-shot Cournot-Nash game is familiar but not very plausible.  Using "reaction 
                     
6  Consider two polar cases: (a) the child responds to the increase in the siblings's 
contribution by reducing her own contribution by the same amount, thus increasing her own 
consumption and leaving the parent's consumption unchanged. (b) the child responds by 
leaving her own contribution to the parent unchanged, thus increasing the parent's 
consumption and leaving her own consumption unchanged. 
7  When the parent coresides with one of the children, we discuss cases in which the parent 





functions" which show each child's best response to the transfers made by the other, we can 
calculate the equilibrium.  (Figure 1).  When public good provision is a simultaneous move 
one-shot game, the public good will be underprovided.  More specifically, if both children 
make positive contributions to the family public good, then the equilibrium is Pareto 
inefficient: there exist strictly greater contribution levels that both children would prefer to 
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.   
This underprovision result does not hold if only one child makes positive 
contributions in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.  In the one contributing child case, just as in 
the one-child case, provision is Pareto efficient.  
 
A
o.ii. A noncooperative, repeated, voluntary contribution game. 
  Now suppose the children play a repeated voluntary contribution game.  More 
specifically, suppose that at the beginning of every period each child has the opportunity to 
make transfers to the parent.  To simplify the analysis, suppose that neither the parent nor 
the children can carry over resources from one period to another, so that the stage games 
played in successive periods are identical.  Hence, the stage games are related only because 
the children can punish each other for misbehavior by reducing their own contributions to 
the public good. 
  If the children are sufficiently patient, then the folk theorem asserts that any feasible, 
individually rational allocation is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game.  
Hence, the repeated game has a very large set of subgame perfect equilibria some of which 
are Pareto efficient, but many of which are not.  Unless we introduce additional assumptions Child   1's   reaction   function
Child  2's  reaction   function
Figure 1: Children’s Reaction Functions for Transfers
Transfers from Child 2
T2*





about how family members play the game, we cannot narrow down the set of subgame 
perfect equilibria or assign probabilities to them.  A cogent objection to modeling children's 
transfers to a disabled elderly parent as an infinitely repeated game is the assumption that 
the game will continue indefinitely.  Because the game will eventually stop, end game 
considerations may affect behavior from the outset.  The theoretical argument that games 
with known end points unravel is strong, but empirical evidence suggests that unraveling 
need not occur.
8  Stochastic termination is more plausible, perhaps because of the death of 
the parent or one of the children or a dramatic change in the parent's health status (e.g., a 
stroke requiring hospitalization, making continued independence infeasible).  But stochastic 
termination complications the analysis because the stage games played in successive periods 
are not identical. 
 
A
o.iii. A cooperative game. 
  Now suppose, as Shubik would have us assume in analyzing a "complex, loosely 
structured social interaction," that the second-stage game is cooperative.  We can conclude 
immediately that, conditional on the living arrangement, the second stage equilibrium is 
Pareto efficient.  Unlike noncooperative games, cooperative games make no mention of 
strategies or moves, but instead require us to specify both the payoffs attainable by each 
coalition and a solution concept.  We discuss two solution concepts:  the Nash bargaining 
solution and the core. The Nash bargaining solution, the leading solution concept in 
                     
8  The “centipede game” is the standard example of an experimental game in which 





bargaining models of marriage, selects a particular Pareto-efficient outcome as the solution. 
(Figure 2).  Which Pareto-efficient allocation it selects depends on the specification of the 
threat point (T
1, T
2).  Bargaining models of marriage have emphasized Nash bargaining and 
neglected other cooperative bargaining models and solution concepts.  For example, 
although Manser and Brown considered both the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) 
bargaining solutions, subsequent work on bargaining in families has virtually ignored Kalai-
Smorodinsky.  Gugl (2004) provides an interesting exception, considering both the Nash 
and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions.  Gugl’s work suggests that the difficulty of 
doing comparative statics with Kalai-Smorodinsky may account for its eclipse by the Nash 
bargaining solution. 
  The core is the set of feasible, undominated allocations -- allocations that cannot be 
improved upon by any coalition.  With two players, the core is the set of utility allocations 
corresponding to points on the frontier in Figure 2 (i.e., the set of Pareto-efficient 
allocations).  With three players, core allocations must not only be Pareto efficient (i.e., the 
coalition of all three players cannot improve upon the allocation), but must satisfy the 
additional condition that no coalition of two players can improve their own well-being at the 
expense of the third player.  A drawback of the core as a solution concept is that it may fail 
to predict a unique equilibrium and that the set of equilibria may be large.
9  Without 
additional assumptions, we cannot reduce the set of equilibria  or assign probabilities to the 
elements of the set.  The core, despite its prominence in game theory, has received almost 
                     
9  If the players are sufficiently patient, the folk theorem implies that the set of equilibria in 
the repeated game is much larger than the core.  
 
 














no attention as a solution concept in the economics of the family, perhaps because it does 
not yield a unique solution in two-person games, and perhaps because, in games with more 
than two players, the core may be empty. 
 
A
o.iv. Pareto efficiency when the parent lives on her own in the community  
  When the parent lives on her own in the community Pareto efficiency is plausible 
but not necessary.  The Coasian tradition holds that efficient outcomes emerge from 
bargaining, at least when the number of agents is small, information is symmetric, and 
transaction costs are negligible.  But the Coasian tradition rests on assumption, not on 
argument.  Indeed, a critic might argue that the Coasian tradition amounts to little more than 
following Shubik's suggestion and assuming that bargaining is a cooperative game.   
 
A
n ..The parent lives in a nursing home. 
  The logical structure of the second-stage game when the parent lives in a nursing 
home is essentially identical to its structure when she lives on her own in the community.  
As when the parent lives on her own in the community, in the second stage game the 
children take the parent's living arrangement as given.  Not surprisingly, some specifications 
of the second stage game imply efficient equilibria, other specifications imply inefficient 
equilibria, and still others imply multiple equilibria, some efficient and some inefficient.  As 
when the parent lives on her own in the community, Pareto efficiency is plausible but not 
necesssary. Because at this level of abstraction the efficiency of transfers when the parent 








2.  The parent resides with a child. 
  Coresidence increases the strategic asymmetry between the children and weakens 
the bargaining power of the coresident child.  Of course strategic asymmetry is always 
present.  Even when the parent lives independently in the community or in a nursing home, 
the children may differ in gender, family responsibilities, labor force attachment, and 
attachment or proximity to the parent.
10  Like coresidence, many of these differences are 
endogenous.  For definiteness, and without loss of generality, for the remainder of this 
section in which the parent coresides with a child, we suppose that the parent coresides with 
child 1. 
  We emphasize the strategic asymmetry between the coresident and the noncoresident 
child because it has implications for the choice of living arrangements in the first stage 
game.  We begin by assuming that the parent is a passive spectator rather than a strategic 
player.  Using the model proposed by Weiss and Willis (1985) in the context of child 
support following divorce, we examine the implications of coresidence for the 
noncoresident child's ability to monitor the way transfers are used by the coresident child.  
We then consider the way in which coresidence and the frequency of contact it implies is 
likely to affect the coresident child's awareness of the parent's needs or her attachment to the 
parent.  Finally, we allow the parent to be a strategic player, assuming that allocation within 
the coresident household is the outcome of a cooperative game between the coresident child 
                     
10  Konrad, et al. (2002) argue that older children exploit their first mover advantage by 
moving away from their parents, leaving younger children to bear a disproportionate share 





and the parent. 
  Weiss and Willis provide a framework for analyzing the effect of coresidence on 
bargaining power.  Their concern is child support following divorce, but the strategic 
position of the noncoresident child contemplating contributing to the coresident household 
is similar to that of the noncustodial parent contemplating child support.  In Weiss and 
Willis the child's well-being is a parental public good valued by both parents.  Each parent, 
however, is also concerned with his or her private consumption and unconcerned with the 
private consumption of the ex-spouse.  The noncustodial parent, for definiteness, the 
divorced father, because he does not coreside with the child, is poorly positioned to monitor 
his ex-wife's allocation of child support between herself and the child.  Weiss and Willis 
view the inability of the father to monitor the mother's allocation of resources between 
herself and the child as the crucial feature of the strategic situation.  The inability to monitor 
precludes binding, enforceable agreements between the parents: the father is rationally 
concerned that if he increases his contribution, his ex-wife will respond by reducing hers. 
  Weiss and Willis model child support as a one-shot Stackelberg game: the first 
mover, the father, contributes resources to the mother; the mother then allocates resources 
between herself and the child.  As Weiss and Willis show, the equilibrium allocation is 
Pareto inefficient: both parents would prefer an allocation in which they both reduced their 
private consumption and increased their transfers to the child.  The Stackelberg game 
captures the intuition that the child will receive less than the Pareto-efficient level of 
resources.  The Weiss and Willis conclusion is appealing, although asymmetric information, 





in their formal model. 
  Neither child support nor long-term care is a one-shot Stackelberg game, but the 
Weiss and Willis insight about the strategic importance of the inability to monitor applies to 
both.  The analogy between long-term care and the Weiss and Willis Stackleberg model of 
child support is closest when the parent has a cognitive disability such as severe Alzheimer's 
that precludes her active participation in the allocation process.  Under these circumstances, 
the coresident child allocates resources between herself and the parent, just as in Weiss and 
Willis the mother allocates resources between herself and a child.  Replacing the one-shot 
Stackelberg game by a sequence of Stackelberg games would not alter the analysis. If the 
noncoresident child is unable to monitor the allocation of resources in the coresident 
household, then a repeated game would not remove the problems because the noncoresident 
child lacks the information required to know when to “punish” the coresident child. The 
analysis of both long-term care and child support becomes more complicated if the 
individual receiving care is an active player rather than a passive recipient of care.  
  Once coresidence is established, the coresident child may have incentives to 
maintain it because termination would impose high psychic costs or adversely affect 
instrumental or affective relationships with other family members.  That is, once 
coresidence becomes the status quo, the coresident child may find termination difficult and 
costly.  We can interpret the coresident child's incentives to continue coresidence in terms of 
rewards offered for continuing or, equivalently, in terms of punishments threatened for 
terminating.  The noncoresident child, knowing that her sister cannot easily terminate 





by increasing hers.  England and Folbre (2003), describing the predicament of paid care 
workers, write: "these emotional bonds [to those receiving care] put care workers in a 
vulnerable position.  We might call the workers 'prisoners of love'; a kind of emotional 
'hostage effect' comes into play" (p. 73). The logic of their argument applies with even 
greater force to care provided by family members.
11   
  We now drop our assumption that the parent is a passive spectator and assume 
instead that she is an active player.  We begin with the one-child case and consider the 
implications of coresidence for bargaining between the coresident child and the parent.  We 
then return to the two-child case, and consider the implications of coresidence for 
bargaining between the noncoresident child, the coresident child, and the parent. 
  Following Pezzin and Schone (1999a, 2002a) we assume that when the parent and a 
child coreside their interactions are cooperative but when they do not coreside their 
interactions are noncooperative.  We assume that, within the coresident household, control 
over resources affects allocation.  That is, government and family transfers to the coresident 
child have a different effect than transfers to the parent.  More formally, resources 
controlled by the coresident child and resources controlled by the parent are separate 
arguments of the coresident household's allocation rule.  Empirical work by Hayashi (1995) 
and by Pezzin and Schone (1997) on allocation within two-generation households finds that 
resources controlled by the elderly parents have a different effect on household expenditure 
patterns 
                     
11  In a dynamic model, contributions by the noncoresident child might decrease over time 
while contributions by the coresident child might increase; our static models, however, 





than resources controlled by their coresident adult children.
12  
Government programs that provide direct payments, in-kind services, or tax 
incentives to households with a disabled elderly member are uniform across households 
rather than tailored to the allocation rules of particular households.  Government transfers, 
like private transfers, affect allocations in the coresident household through its allocation 
rule.  Hence, government policies that provide resources to disabled elderly parents will 
have systematically and predictably different effects than policies that provide the same 
resources to coresident children.  
  We now return to the two child case.  To model the asymmetry between the 
positions of the noncoresident child and the coresident child, we assume that the second 
stage game contains two substages: in the first substage, the noncoresident child makes 
transfers to the coresident child and to the parent; in the second substage, the coresident 
child and the parent play a cooperative game.  For definiteness, think of the coresident 
household's behavior as determined by a cooperative Nash bargaining game in which the 
threat point depends on the allocation of transfers between the coresident child and the 
parent.
13  Thus, the noncoresident child must decide not only how much to transfer to the 
                     
12  In a similar vein, empirical work by Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) on allocation 
within married couple households finds that resources controlled by husbands have a 
different effect on household expenditure patterns than resources controlled by wives. 
13  We do not assume that the parent and the coresident child play as a "team."  The team 
assumption, like the unitary model, would imply that the parent and the coresident child act 
as a single player.  That is, the coresident household would act as if it had a single 
preference ordering and a single budget constraint (i.e., as if the parent and the coresident 
child pooled their resources).  If the coresident child and the parent are a team, then the 
behavior of the coresident household would be independent of how the noncoresident child 





coresident household, but also on the allocation of transfers between the coresident child 
and the parent.
14  We represent the allocation that emerges from the full second stage game 
by an allocation rule. 
Pareto efficiency is less plausible when the parent coresides with one of the children. 
Within the coresident household, Pareto efficiency depends on assuming either that the 
parent is not an active player or, alternatively, that the parent and the coresident child 
bargain to a Pareto-efficient allocation.  Of course Pareto efficiency in the coresident 
household is guaranteed if the parent and the coresident child play a cooperative game.  The 
difficulty, however, is not within the coresident household but in interactions between the 
coresident household and the noncoresident child.  The situation is similar to that modeled 
by Weiss and Willis in their analysis of child support by noncustodial (and noncoresident) 
parents.  Analogous to the noncustodial parent in Weiss and Willis, the noncoresident child 
might be willing to contribute or contribute more to the disabled elderly parent, but refrains 
from doing so because she is concerned that the coresident child will "tax" the increased 
contribution and spend some portion of it on herself.  Thus, when the parent coresides with 
one of her adult children, Pareto efficiency in the second stage game is possible but not as 
plausible as when the parent lives on her own in the community or in a nursing home.  
 
4. The first stage game: living arrangements 
                     
14  The government may allocate a portion of its transfers to the coresident child rather than 
the disabled elderly parent, and by doing so may induce a child to invite coresidence.  A 
child cannot use the prospect of such transfers to induce a sibling to offer coresidence unless 






  In this section we analyze the first stage game.  In section 4a we show that the 
equilibrium of our two-stage game can be Pareto inefficient even when the second stage 
game is Pareto efficient conditional on the living arrangement.  In section 4b we show that 
the equilibrium may depend on the precise specification of the first-stage game (e.g., when 
the game is sequential, the equilibrium may depend on which child moves first), and we 
consider games in which the parent is an active player.  Finally, in section 4c we show that 
the game may have multiple equilibria; more specifically, we consider a game in which all 
family members move simultaneously and show that 5 of its 12 strategy profiles are 
equilibria.   
  We begin by describing the first stage game.  Because the parent cares about living 
arrangements as well as private consumption, she might prefer to live independently with 
fewer consumption goods than live with child i with more.    Suppose that the second-stage 
game associates with each living arrangement unique consumption values for the parent and 











































2)}.  In either case, these preferences over consumption and living arrangements induce a 
preference ranking over living arrangements by the parent and by each of the children.  
These induced preferences play a crucial role in our analysis of the first stage game.  Each 






the implications of each living arrangement for the child’s private consumption.
15 
  As an initial example, we model the first stage as consisting of simultaneous moves 
by the siblings, followed by a decision by the parent, who chooses among the living 
arrangements available to her.  Each child has two moves: inviting coresidence (v) or not 
inviting coresidence (v').  For each profile of moves (e.g., both invite coresidence; child 1 
invites coresidence and child 2 does not, etc.), we assume that the resulting levels of utility 
are known to each child  (e.g., if both invite coresidence, they know that the parent will 
choose to live with child 1), or, more precisely, they can assign probabilities to each living 
arrangement. 
  In the first stage example described above, the parent will choose her preferred 
living arrangement from the available options determined by the children's invitations.  This 
choice is based on the parent’s calculation of the utility levels attainable in each living 
arrangement.  The parent faces at most four alternatives, depending on whether both 
children invite coresidence, neither child invites coresidence, or one child invites 
coresidence and the other does not.  Two loose ends remain: nonuniqueness in the solution 
to the second stage game, and nonuniqueness in the parent's choice.   
If the allocation rule associates a unique consumption pattern with each living 
arrangement, then the parent will prefer one to the other or be indifferent between them.  We  
                     
15  Problems can arise if the second-stage game associates more than one consumption value 
with some living arrangement.  More specifically, the analysis proceeds with no difficulty 
provided probabilities are associated with each of the possible consumption outcomes.  





assume that the parent's ranking of living arrangements is an ordering.  If the ordering is 
strict (i.e., no ties), then we can proceed directly to the analysis of the first stage game.  If 
the ordering is not strict, then the parent will sometimes face situations in which the "best" 
living arrangement is not unique.  Although such ties pose no problem for the parent, they 
do for the children who must decide at the first stage whether to invite coresidence.  
Henceforth, we assume that the ordering is strict to avoid the difficulties associated with 
ties.   
A multiplicity of equilibria in the second stage game poses a troubling problem.
16  
The problem arises because the parent cannot choose among living arrangements unless she 
can assign probabilities to each allocation in the set. If the allocation rule associates 
probabilities with each allocation in the set, then choosing among living arrangements is 
like choosing among lottery tickets.  In the absence of such probabilities, however, we 
encounter difficulties modeling parental choice.   
  Before turning to our examples, we dispose of an expositional complication.  We 
want to treat family members as if they have direct preferences over living arrangements.  
Provided the parent and the children can predict the transfers that would take place in each 
possible living arrangement, we can legitimately focus on induced preferences over living 
arrangements, relying on the fact that each living arrangement is associated with unique 
levels of private consumption, of care for the parent, and of privacy for the children and for 
the parent.  Hence, instead of carrying forward notation that explicitly recognizes the role of 
                     
16  Multiple equilibria can arise in cooperative second stage games (e.g., when the core is the 
solution concept) and in noncooperative second stage games (e.g., in repeated games as a 





private consumption for the children and for the parent, we work with the induced 
preferences over living arrangements. 
4a.  Pareto Inefficient Equilibria 
  To construct an example of a game with an inefficient equilibrium, we begin by 
specifying the preferences of each family member.  Suppose preferences for the parent’s 
living arrangement (taking account of the transfers that would be made and the implied 
consumption pattern) are represented by: 
  Parent’s Ranking  Child 1’s Ranking  Child 2’s Ranking 
 Parent  lives: 
First Choice   with Child 1  with Child 2  with Child 1 
Second Choice  with Child 2  independently  independently 
Third Choice  independently  with Child 1  with Child 2 
Fourth Choice  in nursing home  in nursing home  in nursing home 
 
That is, the parent prefers to live with child 1, but would rather live with child 2 than live 
independently.  Each child prefers that the parent coreside with the other child, and each 
child would prefer that the parent live independently rather than coreside with the parent.  
The unique equilibrium, indeed, the dominant strategy equilibrium, of any game in which 
the children have these preferences has the parent living independently.  With these 
preferences, the nursing home living arrangement is an option that the parent would never 
choose, and one that the children know that she would never choose. 





would contribute "enough," and that the sister would rather contribute enough than have the 
parent live independently.
17  An omniscient and omnipotent social planner could impose a 
solution on the family that would make everyone -- the parent and both children -- better off 
by requiring that the parent live with child 1 and requiring child 2 to contribute "enough."  
But the family cannot achieve this or any other Pareto-efficient solution and is misguided, as 
if by an invisible hand, to a Pareto inefficient equilibrium. The demonstration of 
inefficiency depends on comparing a living arrangement and transfer pattern that a social 
planner might impose with the living arrangement and transfer pattern that would emerge as 
the equilibrium of a two-stage game.  Our argument does not establish nor do we claim that 
for all configurations of preferences the equilibrium of the two-stage game is inefficient.  
We have established that for some configurations of preferences the equilibrium is 
inefficient.  
  Lundberg and Pollak (2003) describe and analyze a related two-stage game in the 
context of bargaining within marriages:  the "two-earner couple location problem."  In 
Lundberg and Pollak, spouses play a two-stage game in which the first stage determines the 
location (e.g., whether the couple moves to the husband's preferred location or the wife's 
preferred location), and the second stage determines allocation within marriage.  When the 
spouses prefer different locations, inefficient outcomes (e.g., inefficient divorces) are 
possible even when the second stage game is efficient conditional on the location 
                     
17  Anna Rubinchik-Pessach suggests formalizing this by supposing that there are two 
possible contribution levels, 0 and T**, and writing down preference profiles corresponding 
to each of them.  Thus, everyone prefers the outcome in which child 2 contributes T** and 





determined in the first stage.  An analogous  result holds in our long-term care game – the 
equilibrium of the two-stage long-term care game may be an inefficient living arrangement, 
even when second stage transfers are efficient conditional on the living arrangement.  The 
crucial features of both the two-earner couple location game and our long-term care game 
are that first-stage decisions affect future bargaining power and that family members cannot 
or will not make binding, enforceable agreements. 
 
4b. Outcomes depend on the structure of the first-stage game 
  To construct an example in which the equilibrium living arrangement depends on the 
precise specification of the first stage game, we again begin by specifying each family 
member's preferences.   
  Parent’s Ranking  Child 1’s Ranking  Child 2’s Ranking 
 Parent  lives: 
First Choice   with Child 1  with Child 2  with Child 1 
Second Choice  with Child 2  with Child 1  with Child 2 
Third Choice  independently  independently  independently 
Fourth Choice  in nursing home  in nursing home  in nursing home 
 
That is, the parent prefers to live with child 1, but would rather live with child 2 than live 
independently.  Each child prefers that the parent coreside with the other child, but each 
child prefers coresidence with the parent to having the parent live independently.  Both 






  Using these preferences, we consider alternative specifications of the first stage 
game.  We first consider three specifications of the noncooperative first-stage game in 
which the children move before the parent, then three specifications in which the parent 
moves before the children.  Finally, we consider a specification in which the parent and the 
children move simultaneously. 
 
i. Children move before the parent. 
  We consider two sequential games that differ in which child moves first and then 
consider a simultaneous move game.  When Child 1 moves first, she does not invite (v') the 
parent to coreside; the best response of child 2 is to invite (v) the parent to coreside, and the 
parent accepts the invitation.  When Child 2 moves first, she does not invite the parent to 
coreside; the best response of child 1 is to invite the parent to coreside, and the parent 
accepts the invitation.  The simultaneous move game has two pure strategy equilibria: (1) 
Child 1 invites coresidence, and child 2 does not; the parent accepts the invitation of child 1. 
 (2) Child 2 invites coresidence, and child 1 does not; the parent accepts the invitation of 
child 2.
18   
  These examples demonstrate that the equilibrium of our two-stage game can depend 
on the precise specification of the game (e.g., which child moves first in the sequential 
game) and that some specifications of the game (e.g., the game in which the children move 
                     






 simultaneously) can have multiple equilibria.  In section 4c we offer an example with a 
richer set of equilibria. 
 
ii. Parent moves before the children.  
  When the parent moves first, she can be a strategic player.  Suppose that the parent  
can commit herself to reject particular invitations, if she should receive them.
19 
20 More 
specifically, the game begins with the parent choosing among three moves.  
   (i) preemptively reject an invitation from Child 1 (r1) 
  (ii) preemptively reject an invitation from Child 2 (r2) 
  (iii) make no preemptive rejection of any invitation (r') 
The children then move, either sequentially or simultaneously, as described above.  Finally, 
the parent chooses a living arrangement: she can live independently or in a nursing home or 
accept any invitation she has received except those she has preemptively rejected. 
 
  The analysis of these games is straightforward.  The parent begins by committing 
herself to reject an invitation from child 2.  The equilibrium of all three games -- the two 
sequential games and the simultaneous game -- is an invitation from child 1, which the 
parent accepts.  This example shows that the ability of a family member (in this case, the 
parent) to commit can alter the equilibrium outcome and, in this case, commitment enables 
                     
19  Shelly Lundberg suggests that the parent might achieve the same result by insulting a 
child’s spouse. 
20  We assume that the parent cannot commit herself to reject living independently or in a 
nursing home.  If she could commit herself to rejecting one or both of these living 





the parent to achieve the outcome she prefers.  
4c.  Multiple equilibria 
iii. The parent and the children move simultaneously. 
  The simultaneous game has 12 strategy profiles and 5 of these are equilibria.  Recall 
that the disabled parent has 3 possible strategies (r1, r2, r'), and each child has two possible 
strategies (v, v').  The reader can verify that the 5 equilibria are: 
  (r1, v', v)   parent lives with child 2 
  (r2, v, v')   parent lives with child 1 
  (r2, v, v)   parent lives with child 1 
  (r', v', v)   parent lives with child 2 
  (r', v, v')  parent lives with child 1. 




4d. Agency for the parent 
  As we have already seen, the parent becomes a strategic player in the first-stage 
game if she has the ability to reject certain invitations.  An alternative specification of the 
first-stage game can increase the parent's bargaining power.  Instead of assuming that the 
children issue invitations which the parent must accept or reject, suppose that the parent 
issues invitations which the children must accept or reject. 
                     
21  If the parent moves first and the children observe her move and then play a simultaneous 





  For the configuration of preferences in our first example, the parent derives no 
strategic advantage from issuing invitations: regardless of what invitations she issues, the 
only equilibrium is living independently in the community.
22  For the configuration of 
preferences in our second example, the parent can achieve her preferred outcome (living 
with child 1) if she can issue invitations.  For example, if the rules of the game require her to 
issue all invitation simultaneously, then she can accomplish her desired outcome by issuing 
an invitation only to child 1.  If the rules of the game allow sequential invitations, she can 
accomplish her desired outcome by first inviting child 2 to coreside and, when child 2 
rejects her invitation, inviting child 1 to coreside. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  We have used a two-stage bargaining model to analyze the living arrangement of a 
disabled elderly parent and transfers to the parent from her adult children.  The first stage 
determines the living arrangement, the second child-to-parent transfers.  Working by 
backward induction, we first calculate an allocation rule that specifies the level of transfers 
that each child would provide to the parent in each living arrangement.  We then analyze the 
living arrangement(s) that emerge as equilibria of the first stage game.  Because the living 
arrangement affects bargaining power in the second stage game, and because family 
members at the first stage are unwilling or unable to make binding agreements regarding 
transfers at the second stage, the equilibria of the two-stage game may be Pareto inefficient 
                     
22  The outcome might be different if the parent could commit herself to moving into a 
nursing home, the worst outcome for her and for the children, unless child 1 would coreside 





even if the equilibrium of the second stage subgame is conditionally efficient.  
  A better understanding of the process by which families come to assume the 
responsibility and share the burden of caring for the disabled elderly is essential for 
designing and evaluating long-term care policies.  Governments have long recognized that 
their long-term care policies have distributional implications.  That is, long-term care 
policies affect how the burden of long-term care is shared between generations, within 
generations, between families, and within families.  As governments increasingly explore 
policies to address the needs of their growing disabled elderly populations, the possibility 
that families’ long-term care decisions may result in inefficient outcomes suggests an 
additional role for public policy:  promoting efficiency.  Initiatives may be tailored to family 
living arrangements, for example, by taxing non-coresiding adult children or subsidizing co-
residing adult children for both their informal care services and relative loss of bargaining 
power, in order to promote more efficient outcomes.
23  While government transfer schedules 
that are independent of family living arrangements are analytically simpler than schedules 
that are not, contingent transfer schedules may limit the deadweight loss associated with 
government efforts to ensure the availability of long-term care.  Public long-term care 
policy will be enhanced by recognizing that the caregiving behavior of family members 
responds to the incentives created by public programs.   
                     
23  In the United States, examples of such an initiative are state programs under the Home 
and Community-Based Waivers that either condition eligibility for services on the presence 
of an “active” family caregiver or provide more, rather than less, hours of paid assistance to 
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